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Abstract 
 
The variation in the degree of price regulation in the property-liability insurance market in Canada varies across time 
and space, creating an opportunity to test a recurring theory in regulatory economics: that price regulated firms have 
higher levels of financial leverage. Using an instrumental variable for the stringency of price-regulation, this paper 
utilizes a panel data set of Canadian property-liability insurers over ten years of time, 1997-2006. The results 
support the theory but do not conclude on whether the increase in financial leverage is a strategic decision or a 
natural reaction to worsening business conditions brought-on by price-regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
Rate-regulated (i.e., price-regulated) firms may alter their capital structure for strategic purposes as argued by 
Spiegel and Spulber (1994). The argument is one of strategic brinksmanship; that is, a price-regulated firm may alter 
its capital structure in order to increase its probability of bankruptcy with the anticipation that the regulator will be 
concerned about the firm’s participation constraint and, therefore, not be as severe in suppressing prices since a 
harsh suppression would cause the firm to exit the market due to bankruptcy.  
 
With strategic brinksmanship, inefficiencies are created because of the increase in the probability of bankruptcy. 
The inefficiencies occur because of the assumption that bankruptcy costs are positive. As the probability of 
bankruptcy increases, the expected bankruptcy costs increase.  
 
This paper uses panel data from Canada to replicate a study by Klein, Phillips and Shiu (2002), on the effect of 
price-regulation on the financial leverage of property-liability insurers in the US. 
 
Section 2 discusses the theoretical literature related to the determinants of capital structure, financial leverage, and 
the probability of bankruptcy. Section 3 discusses related empirical literature as it applies to other industries besides 
the insurance industry. Section 4 briefly discusses price-regulation of insurance. Sections 5, 6, and 7 cover the data 
sources used in this paper, the empirical specifications, and the results. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Determinants of Capital Structure 
Spiegel and Spulber (1994) argue that a firm’s capital structure has a significant effect on the regulated price that the 
firm receives from the regulator. In a three-stage bargaining game, Spiegel and Spulber (1994) find that firms will 
issue debt in order to increase their probability of bankruptcy and therefore force the regulator (who cares about 
market participation) to provide a regulated price which is not as severe as it might otherwise have been. By 
providing the firm with a higher regulated price, the regulator saves the firm from bankruptcy. The partition of funds 
between debt holders and equity holders does not, as shown by Modigliani and Miller (1958), affect the value of the 
firm. The issuance of debt, however, is not the only way to increase the probability of bankruptcy.  
2 
 
 
In addition to the issuance of debt, a price-regulated firm can increase its probability of bankruptcy by increasing 
other liabilities. By increasing its general accounts payable, unearned revenue and other obligations, a firm can 
increase its probability of bankruptcy. In specific relation to the insurance industry, liability accounts include unpaid 
claims as well as prepaid premiums (premium money that has been paid to the insurer which the insurer has not yet 
earned). An interesting question arises when recognizing that a firm can increase its probability of bankruptcy by 
means other than an issuance of debt securities—does the firm increase its probability of bankruptcy strategically or 
is it merely a natural response to worsening business conditions in which revenue is decreased because of price-
regulation? 
 
A firm facing worsening business conditions (decreased per-unit revenue because of price-regulation) might take 
longer to pay claims and require consumers to pay their premiums earlier in advance. It is also reasonable to think 
that a firm might issue debt in order to meet short-term cash-flow challenges that might result because of price-
regulation. 
 
While a number of empirical studies find a positive relationship between price-regulation and financial leverage (as 
discussed in the next section), the underlying theory is not conclusive enough to rule-out the possibility that an 
increase in financial leverage could be a reaction to worsening business conditions…especially when considering a 
price-regulated industry that is naturally competitive. 
 
Spiegel and Spulber (1994), Dasgupta and Nanda (1993), and Taggart (1981) argue that firms alter their capital 
structure out of strategy. In addition to this argument, it is possible that firms alter their general accounts payable 
and other liabilities out of strategy as well. If a price-regulated firm expects the regulator to base its decision (the 
choice of regulated price) even in-part on the firm’s probability of bankruptcy, the decision to alter any determinant 
of the probability of bankruptcy (debt or payables) could be partly strategic. Nevertheless, it does not matter for the 
purposes of estimating the coefficients in this paper. It does, however, matter for the interpretation of the results. 
Primarily, the estimation can proceed so long as financial leverage (the dependent variable) is a function of price-
regulation and that price-regulation is not a function of financial leverage (i.e., no endogeneity). 
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It is possible, however, that price-regulation could be a function of financial leverage. Taking financial distress as 
exogenous (and assuming that financial leverage would then be high), it may be the case that firms increase prices as 
a response to their distress. If the regulator then bases its decision to regulate or not on the current price level, it 
could inadvertently be the case that price-regulation is a function of financial leverage. 
 
While it is remotely possible that price-regulation could be a function of financial leverage, it is more likely that the 
decision to regulate prices or not is exogenous since such decision may be a political decision whereas financial 
distress would more likely be endogenous. Furthermore, the possibility of endogeneity is controlled for through the 
use of an instrumental variable which is explained in more detail in the empirical section. In short though, the 
variance in the cost structure of the insurance industry across space and time implies that a fixed price-regulation 
becomes more stringent as costs increase and less stringent as costs decrease. The instrumental variable helps 
control for this. 
 
Assuming property liability insurance companies are competitive and earn zero economic profit, they might reduce 
their costs (and corresponding service/ product quality levels) when revenue is reduced because of price-regulation. 
As noted, costs could be decreased by increasing the time to pay liabilities. Increasing the average wait-time before 
paying a bill would increase the size of an insurer’s different liability accounts and might include unpaid claims and 
unearned premiums.  
 
There are efficiency losses from binding price-regulation in a naturally competitive market such as the property-
liability insurance market in Canada. Regardless of whether firms respond to price-regulation strategically or as a 
natural business response to less revenue, efficiencies are lost. Firstly, service quality might be lowered because the 
insurer might adjust costs in order to offset the revenue reduction from price-regulation.2 Further, an increase in the 
probability of bankruptcy increases expected bankruptcy costs.3 Lastly, insurers hold equity capital as a guarantee 
                                                   
2
 Although the prior-to-price-regulation equilibrium might involve a given level of service, the post-price-regulation equilibrium 
could involve lower service levels as price regulation would affect all insurers and all insurers would need to reduce costs. 
3
 If bankruptcy costs are even just fixed (that is, they don’t increase/ decrease in proportion to firm size), an increase in the 
probability of bankruptcy necessarily increases the expected bankruptcy costs. 
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that they will be able to pay claims even if claims are larger than expected/ larger than premium revenues. One of 
the ways in which insurers can increase their financial leverage is to reduce their equity. If they reduce their equity, 
then, ceteris paribus, their financial quality is lowered and the resultant guarantees that they make to their insureds 
are less valuable. On the other hand, financial leverage can be increased by issuing more debt. If the capital structure 
is assumed to be competitive, without price-regulation, then the additional debt creates an additional inefficiency 
because of its costs. And lastly, there are inefficiencies that could result because of the inefficient price signal that 
binding price-regulation in a competitive market creates. 
 
Lastly on the topic of theory, Klein, Phillips and Shiu (2002) use cross sectional data which does not provide for the 
possibility that firms may alter their exposure to different lines of business and/ or different jurisdictions over time 
(perhaps in response to price-regulation). The current paper with panel data does capture such changes. 
3. Price-regulation and Financial Leverage in Other Industries 
Hagerman and Ratchford (1978) investigate the impact that economic and political variables have on the allowed 
rate-of-return for electric utility companies. Using data from seventy-nine US electric utility companies in thirty-
three states, Hagerman and Ratchford (1978) find that the financial leverage of electric utility companies (measured 
by debt/ equity) has a significant and positive impact on the allowed rate-of-return.  
 
Taggart (1985) finds that the establishment of rate regulation is associated with a “discernible increase in utility debt 
proportions.” Taggart finds that the effect is primarily as a result of regulation’s tendency to reduce business risk but 
that the so called “price influence” effect of price-regulation on the choice of capital structure cannot be rejected. 
 
Dasgupta and Nanda (1993) argue that firms increase their debt in order to increase their bargaining power with the 
regulator. They find evidence that regulated US electric utility companies in the period 1972-1983 increased their 
financial leverage when they were subject to more hostile regulatory environments. 
4. Price-regulation of Insurance 
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Assuming that the property and liability insurance markets are competitive, Cummins (2002), inefficiencies are 
created through price-regulation. In the property and liability insurance markets, price-regulation might result in 
decreased coverage availability, lower product quality and service, higher required return on investment (due to an 
increase because of regulatory uncertainty), lower incentive to control costs, greater moral hazard on the part of 
insured consumers, and less market participation by insurers. 
 
Even given the negative efficiencies created by price-regulation, insurance markets are still often price-regulated. 
Klein, Nordman and Fritz (1993) show that price-regulation is most likely during periods of time when costs are 
escalating. 
5. Data 
Data comes from two sources. Data at the observational level of the firm comes from MSA Research Inc. and data 
on the size of the residual automobile insurance market in each province (used to compose the instrument for 
regulatory price stringency) comes from the Facility Association, an unincorporated Canadian association that 
administers the risk-sharing pools (residual markets) in Canada for personal automobile insurance4. The data is 
similar to that used by Klein, Phillips, and Shiu (2002) with three main exceptions: (1) it is panel data for 1997-2006 
instead of cross-sectional data for 1997, (2) it is for Canada instead of the US, and (3) the Canadian data does not 
contain information on the worker’s compensation insurance market as it is monopolized by provincial governments 
in Canada. 
Three-hundred sixteen (316) property-liability insurance companies had operations in Canada during the years 1997-
2006 inclusive. This includes all property-liability insurers in the MSA Research Inc. data set regardless of the type 
of property-liability insurance products they sold. Some of the 316 insurers entered after 1997 and some left the 
market during this ten-year period of time. As such, this data set was originally unbalanced; all observations not 
present for the entire ten-year period of time have been dropped. The selection/attrition bias is briefly addressed in 
the Results and Conclusion sections of the paper. After dropping firms that were not present for the entire ten year 
                                                   
4
 The risk-sharing pools (a.k.a. residual markets) in Canada are organized as a last resort for consumers who cannot get coverage 
from competitive insurers. The Facility Association then shares the losses and/ or gains from the pool among insurers (thus 
creating the possibility for subsidies to flow from lower-risk consumers to higher-risk consumers). 
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period of time, only one-hundred-thirty-two (132) firms remained. Over ten years, this amounts to 1320 
observations.  
6. Empirics 
The theory tested is that firms with greater price control have higher levels of financial leverage. An instrumental 
variable for the stringency of price-regulation is first introduced. Fixed-effects for each firm are used to control for 
idiosyncrasies that are not captured by the data points available and dummy variables are used to control for each of 
the years in the panel.  
 
The instrumental variable for price-regulation is replicated from Klein, Phillips, and Shiu (2002) as follows5,  
 
∑
=
×
=
11
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j ik
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ik  
 
Where ikNCYREGSTRINGE  is the instrumental variable for the stringency of price-regulation experienced by 
each i insurer in each k year. jkmRSIZE is the variable for the size of the residual automobile insurance market 
(denoted by m) for each j province in each k year. jmiNPW is the variable for net premiums written for each i 
insurer in each j province’s automobile insurance market (denoted by m). ikNPW is the variable for net-premiums-
written for each i insurer in all lines of business (including automobile insurance) for each k year. Binding price-
regulation in the automobile insurance market will be positively correlated with the size of the residual automobile 
insurance market. Furthermore, it will also be positively correlated with rising costs (even as binding price-
regulations remain fixed). 
 
                                                   
5
 Note that the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and the Yukon have been joined into one j province/ territory because of data 
limitations. 
7 
 
The risk-sharing pools (a.k.a. residual markets) for automobile insurance in Canada and the US are generally the last 
resort for consumers who desire to purchase automobile insurance but for whom competitive insurers will not 
provide coverage. As the stringency of price-regulation increases (description: for more consumers and for more 
companies, the regulated price is below cost)6 the size of the residual market (in that province) will increase and the 
instrumental variable for price-regulation (for the firms affected) will also increase. 
  
The instrumental variable for the stringency of price-regulation is more efficient than the actual price vector chosen 
by the regulator since it also varies in response to the cost structure in each province in each year. For insurance, the 
cost structure is largely composed of costs to pay claims. For claims related to liabilities, these claims costs can vary 
from year to year and province to province (given that each jurisdiction can have different tort/ no-fault legal 
jurisdictions and/ or different precedents for the indemnification of injured parties and that these factors can change 
over time). Given that the legal/ tort system is not set or chosen (generally) as a function of the insurance market, the 
instrumental variable is more efficient than the use of a vector of regulated prices. 
 
As discussed in section 2, a firm’s financial leverage can increase because of an issuance of debt, a decrease in 
equity, or an increase in other liabilities including unpaid claims, prepaid premiums, and general accounts payable. 
These theories are tested in multiple model specifications that all involve fixed-effects at the firm-level, dummy 
variables for the years, and adjusted standard errors for each of the one-hundred-thirty-two (132) insurance company 
clusters. 
Dependent Variables 
Six specifications with different dependent variables are used to test the theory. The most straightforward variable is 
the ratio total liabilities/ total equity. Total equity was used instead of total surplus (as was used by Klein, Phillips, 
and Shiu (2002)) because the data source’s definition of surplus changed in 2003—as such, the variable for surplus 
would have been inconsistent over the time-period analyzed.7 
 
                                                   
6
 NB: Consumers of automobile insurance typically face differentiated costs based on their risk-type. 
7
 According to MSA Research Inc., statutory surplus was defined as: [Assets- Liabilities- Reserves Required] prior to 2003 when 
it was discontinued and replaced with adjusted equity defined as: [Total Equity - Capital Required for Catastrophes and 
Reinsurance Ceded to Unregistered Insurers.] 
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The second variable is the ratio total liabilities/ liquid assets. The estimated coefficient is expected to be larger than 
it will be for total liabilities/ total equity since liquid assets can be liquidated and adjusted faster than other assets. 
 
The third dependent variable is the ratio unearned premiums/ equity and is expected to increase with the stringency 
of price-regulation as price-regulated insurers may demand/ require more premiums be paid in advance by their 
consumers. 
 
The fourth dependent variable is the ratio unpaid claims/ equity and is expected to increase with regulatory price 
stringency since insurers may take a longer time to pay claims as a means of increasing financial leverage and/ or 
responding to worsening business conditions brought on by price-regulation. 
 
The fifth dependent variable is the ratio payables/ equity where payables is defined as money owing to Agents, 
Brokers, Policyholders, Other Insurers, Subsidiaries and Affiliates. The payables/ equity variable is similar to the 
second, third and fourth dependent variables but more broad. 
 
The sixth and final dependent variable is the ratio total net premiums written/ equity and is particular to the 
insurance industry. 
Independent Variables 
The only variable used for regulatory price stringency is the ikNCYREGSTRINGE  variable identified above. 
Fixed-effects for the individual firms as well as dummy variables for the years help to control for unobserved 
variance. Klein, Phillips, and Shiu (2002) use four different dummy variables to control for firm-characteristics 
which are not replicated in this paper given that fixed-effects are used to control for firm-specific unobserved 
variation. 
 
Some of the variables used by Klein et al. were not replicated in this paper because the data did not exist or did not 
span the entire period of time considered. These variables include the non-debt tax shield variable, volatility of 
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earnings, Herfindahl indexes, free cash flow variable, average maturity of liabilities, and variables meant to control 
for risky investment strategies. 
 
The variable return on assets is used as a control variable since firms with higher profits may have more equity and, 
therefore, lower financial leverage. Likewise, the natural log of assets was used in order to control for the possibility 
that larger firms may have a lower probability of bankruptcy because of their size and might therefore have higher 
levels of financial leverage.  
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics based on all observations from the 132 (balanced) Canadian property-
liability insurers in the panel data set over the time period 1997-2006 inclusive. 1320 
observations in total. Dummy variables for years have been omitted to save space. Data from 
MSA Research Inc. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
Dependent Variables      
Total Liabilities to Equity 1320 2.179 1.959 -0.106 12.66 
Total Liabilities to Liquid Assets 1320 0.628 0.324 -0.17 2.184 
Unearned Premiums to Equity 1320 0.634 0.653 -0.626 3.971 
Unpaid Claims to Equity 1320 1.300 1.312 0 12.622 
Total NPW to Equity 1320 1.130 4.576 -1.264 164.034 
      
Regulatory Variable      
Regulatory Stringency 1320 0.147 0.026 -0.162 0.261 
      
Control Variables      
Return on Assets 1320 0.029 0.1 -1.897 1.291 
Natural Log of Assets 1320 11.634 1.955 6.314 15.648 
The negative values of the various variables are a result of accounting procedures and are still 
valid for the analysis. 
7. Results 
The primary fixed-effects regression results are in Table 2 while OLS regression results showing the effect of 
regulatory price stringency on the various components of the dependent variables (without controls for fixed-effects 
or year effects) are in Table 3.  Table 3 may be useful in interpreting Table 2. 
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Table 2. Results, Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis 
Results based on all observations from the 132 (balanced) Canadian property-liability insurers in the panel data set over the 
time period 1997-2006 inclusive. 1320 observations in total. Dummy variables for the years and firm-specific fixed-effects 
have been omitted to save space. Standard Errors have been adjusted for 132 clusters. Data from MSA Research Inc.  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 
 Liabilities to 
Equity 
Liabilities to 
Liquid Assets 
Unearned 
Premiums to 
Equity 
Unpaid Claims 
to Equity 
Total NPW to 
Equity 
Regulatory Stringency 10.537 0.748 3.675 4.998 -0.207 
 (2.15)** (1.54) (2.59)** (1.67)* (-0.06) 
Return on Assets -1.675 -0.185 -0.332 -1.365 12.526 
 (-2.35)** (-2.63)*** (-2.82)*** (-2.26)** (0.95) 
Natural Log of Assets 0.519 0.083 0.115 0.361 -0.436 
 (4.41)*** (4.69)*** (3.12)*** (4.51)*** (-0.79) 
Constant -4.009 -0.335 -0.764 -2.957 5.605 
 (-3.02)*** (-1.67)* (-1.81)* (-3.27)*** (0.94) 
Observations 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 
Number of Insurers 132 132 132 132 132 
R-squared 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.07 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The results show support for the theory that firms increase their financial leverage when faced with stringent price-
regulation. Specification 1 supports the theory that insurance firms with higher levels of stringent price-regulation 
have higher levels of financial leverage. Specification 2’s estimated coefficient for the regulatory stringency variable 
is not significant (the reason for this is not known). 
 
Specification 3 supports the theory and suggests that firms request/ require their consumers to pay their premiums 
farther in advance than they do in the absence of binding price-regulation. This is confirmed by noting in Table 3 
that total equity is positively correlated with regulatory stringency. Unearned premiums may be increasing because 
of strategy or as a natural reaction to worsening business conditions—the results are not conclusive in identifying 
the motivation for the change (strategic or natural response). 
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Table 3. OLS Regression Results 
OLS results (without fixed-effects or dummy variables for years) based on 1320 observations (ten years of 
pooled data from all 132 firms). Data from MSA Research Inc. 
Total 
Liabilities 
Total 
Equity 
Liquid 
Assets 
Unearned 
Premiums 
Unpaid 
Claims Total NPW 
Regulatory 
Stringency 4,868,015 1,073,170 4,948,130 1,330,708 3,088,357 2,075,254 
 
(8.10)** (4.93)** (7.15)** (7.25)** (7.80)** (7.32)** 
Constant 259,889 111,888 334,483 73,620 162,922 121,868 
 
(14.31)** (17.00)** (15.91)** (13.27)** (13.61)** (14.23)** 
Observations 1320 1320 1315 1320 1320 1320 
R-squared 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Specification 4 (Table 2) supports the theory and suggests that insureds may receive their claim money later than 
they would without binding price-regulation. Table 3 shows that the coefficient on unpaid claims is much larger than 
that on total equity and that both are positively correlated with regulatory price stringency, confirming that unpaid 
claims do actually increase as a result of binding price-regulation. Nevertheless, the results are not conclusive since 
it may be the case that the absolute number of accidents that an insurer adjusts might increase with price-regulation. 
It is quite possible that in a price-regulated market the inefficient price signal may encourage more motorists to enter 
the market. As such, there may be more accidents to adjust and insurers may not be able to adjust them in as timely a 
way as they might otherwise (over the short term, until they can hire and train more adjusters). Combined with 
worsening cash flows, insurers may take longer to pay claims because they have more work to do and less revenue 
to do it with. 
 
Specification 5 (in Table 2) is insignificant and therefore neither supports nor disproves the theory. Although Klein, 
Phillips and Shiu (2002) found support for a relationship between binding price-regulation and the ratio 
premiums/surplus, the insignificance of the result in this estimation is more likely due to Canadian solvency 
regulations rather than theory. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) for Canada 
regulates capital requirements for federally regulated property-liability insurance companies and requires that 
insurers hold a margin that is a linear function of unearned premiums (OSFI Minimum Capital Test, 2003, p. 18). 
Since the margin would be linearly associated with equity and since unearned premiums is linearly associated with 
total premiums, it is not surprising that Specification 5 is not significant. In short, federal regulations governing 
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solvency of property-casualty insurers restrict the relationship between premiums and equity and may likely account 
for the insignificance of the result in Specification 5. 
 
In specifications 1-4, the coefficient for the return on assets variable is significant and negative, controlling for the 
possibility that firms with high profitability are more likely to have more equity. Also, the coefficient on the variable 
for the natural log of assets is as expected; it supports the theory that larger firms have lower (unitary) bankruptcy 
costs and/ or lower expected probabilities of bankruptcy and can, therefore, have higher financial leverage ratios. 
 
It is worth noting that Canadian property-liability insurers are restricted in their ability to use debt obligations to 
finance their operations. The Insurance Companies Act combined with the Property and Casualty Companies 
Borrowing Regulations restrict insurers from having debt obligations which, in total, would be greater than two 
percent of the company’s assets.8 This lends some support to the position that the increase in financial leverage is a 
natural response to worsening business conditions (brought on by price-regulation) rather than a strategic action on 
the part of insurers to counter the ability of the regulator to be stringent. 
 
It is worth noting that there is likely a bias in this estimation and the one conducted by Klein, Phillips and Shiu 
(2002). The attrition/ selection bias that occurs is such that if it was corrected for, the coefficients for the regulatory 
stringency variable would likely be larger. Since price-regulation impacts the probability of bankruptcy, it would be 
correct to assume that some firms exit the market (at least in-part) because of binding price-regulation. When firms 
exit the industry because of price-regulation, their financial leverage number does not show-up in the data set; thus, 
a selection bias is likely present. It is likely that the coefficients for regulatory stringency would be larger since it is 
highly likely that firms which are about to go bankrupt would have very high levels of financial leverage. This 
selection bias does not change the qualitative results, but it does bias the quantitative results. The empirical 
correction for this selection/ attrition bias is left for future research. 
 
                                                   
8
 Insurance Companies Act, Section 476; Property and Casualty Companies Borrowing Regulations, Section 7. 
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8. Conclusions 
This brief paper has replicated Klein, Phillips and Shiu (2002) using Canadian panel data and found similar results. 
Although the effect of binding price-regulation on the financial leverage ratios of insurers is positive and significant, 
the interpretation of these results is not conclusive as two possible explanations exist. Insurers may increase their 
financial leverage strategically in order to mitigate the ability of the regulator to cut prices (strategic brinksmanship), 
and/ or, insurers may have increasing financial leverage ratios as a natural reaction to lowered revenue due to price-
regulation. Either way, there are inefficiencies that are created because of binding price-regulation in this market. 
 
A bias was also identified that is likely present in both this and Klein, Phillips, and Shiu (2002). Although the bias 
does not negate the qualitative results, it implies that the effect is likely stronger than estimated. 
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